Thursday, October 25, 2012

     What would you do if you could become invisible and, in essence, do whatever you wanted?  Would you?  Would you take advantage of people?  Would you listen in on private conversations?  Would you amuse yourself at the expense of others?
     This is the dilemma that Plato poses to us in his "Ring of Gyges" dialog, which appears in the second chapter of his Republic.  If a reasonably intelligent person, he asks, could don a "ring" and become invisible and therefore evade any judgment for his (or, if we extrapolate this to our time, "her," too) activities, would this person still be moral?
     I guess it depends on how we define morality.  And that's the problem.  If we define morality on the basis of our perceptions, inevitably it will be flawed.  How can we really know, in ourselves, even with society and social consensus (which is always changing), what is moral?  How can we, bent as we are, really know what is right--all the time, in every age?  Sure, we can come to reasonable conclusions about right and wrong, but ultimately we are looking at, if there is no transcendence, beings without meaning developing morals, as it were, without ground or meaning, too.   Absent a transcendent guide, any way that we look at morality eventually becomes relative, a victim of the constantly changing circumstances in which it is developed.
     And if morality is relative, then, yes, one could do, if he or she were invisible, whatever he/she pleases.  It wouldn't matter:  there is no final authority by which to measure, arbitrate, or judge.
     Well, one could argue, there are certain moral convictions, say, a prohibition against murder, that are constant in every culture.  In general, history seems to support this.
     But all it takes to dispel this notion is one culture.  And we are back to square one.  Again, unless there is a permanent transcendent rule and/or authority, we really have no way to know what is fully and truly moral and whether we are indeed, ring or not, moral.  Finite and limited beings that we are, how could we?  It's all a function of our moment.
     Though we as intelligent and rational beings are fully capable of constructing morality, we must ask ourselves why, really, in a world devoid of point or transcendence, we do (and are able to do) so.  Without a transcendent and personal God, morality lapses into futility.  Brave futility, yes, but futility nonetheless.
     So does Richard Dawkins, whose name we have mentioned before, observes that, in the absence of God or transcendence, there is "no design, no purpose, no evil and no good."  In short, there is no real morality
     Dawkins is more than right.  In the absence of meaning, in the absence of transcendence, in the absence of, to put it another way, a personal God, nothing, including morality, really matters anyway.
     And you can use the ring all you want.

No comments:

Post a Comment